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Finch: Low-Income Housing in the Suburbs: The Problem of Exclusionary Zo

NOTES
LOW-INCOME HOUSING IN THE SUBURBS:
THE PROBLEM OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING*

The goal of a decent home for all Americans, first announced by Congress over twenty years ago,' remains unfulfilled as the demand for housing
becomes increasingly imperative. 2 The existing need for adequate housing
is shared by all segments of the urban population, although inadequacies
fall most heavily on the poor, the black, and other minority groups whose
plight has been exacerbated by the flight of the white middle class to the
suburbs.3 As a consequence of suburban migration, a deflated tax base has
limited the ability of the cities to provide adequate housing. Moreover, with
dwellers, two economically and racithe departure of the more affluent city
4
ally disparate societies have evolved.
Usually by means of exclusionary zoning devices and building codes, the
suburban communities have, sometimes inadvertently, succeeded in prevent.
ing any significant influx of low-income groups. 5 This exclusion is especially
6
significant as industry begins to locate in the suburbs, since inadequate
transportation facilities may limit the ability of low-income groups to reach
*ErroR's NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in the spring 1971 quarter.
1. Declaration of Policy of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §1441 (1964). This
was reaffirmed in the Housing & Urban Development Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §1441a (Supp.
IV, 1965-1968). "Today, after more than three decades of fragmented and grossly underfunded federal housing programs, decent housing remains a chronic problem for the disadvantaged urban household." U.S. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CML DIsoRDERS REPORT 467 (Bantam ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as KERNER REPORT].
2. See generally C. RAPriN & W. GRIGSBY, THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING IN RACIALLY
Msxm AREAS (1960).
3. For purposes of this note any precise definition of the word "suburb" is unnecessary.
Generally it is used in a broad context to encompass bedroom communities, outlying but
non-self-sustaining towns, and the outlying residential areas of the city itself. For a discussion of definitional problems in this area, see Miner, The Folk-Urban Continuum, 17
AM. SOCIOLOGIcAL REV. 529 (1952); Wirth, Urbanism as a Way of Life, 44 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY
1 (1938).
4. The "flight" to the suburbs has been heavily subsidized by the federal government
through FHA loans and highway appropriations - thus creating, or helping to create, the
urban housing problem. Eleven major cities can expect to become more than 50% black
by 1984. Washington, D.C. and Newark, N.J. are already over 50% black. KmEm REPORT,
supra note 1, at 391.
5. "Exclusionary zoning" encompasses large-lot and minimum floor-space zoning ordinances, as well as an express ban on apartments. See Dietsch, Cracking the Suburbs, THE
NEw REPuBLic, Sept. 12, 1970, at 8; Graham, Court Tests of Zoning Against the Poor,
N.Y. Times, June 14, 1970, §4, at 11, col. 5.
6. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that between 1960 and 1967, 62% of all industrial buildings and 52% of all commercial buildings were constructed outside the central
cities, and that over 50% of all new jobs created were outside the cities. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CHANGES IN URBAN AMERICA 1-5 (Rep. No. 353, 1969), cited in

Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 MicH. L. REV. 339, 340 nA (1970).
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potential employment. Consequently, even where transportation facilities
are available, unskilled and semi-skilled workers are forced to commute long
7
distances to their jobs.
The solution to the lack of available low-income housing has traditionally been through government subsidized housing programs.8 However, such
programs have been singularly unsuccessful in attempts to locate in the
suburbs. 9 Recognizing this failure, the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders has suggested a reorientation of federal housing programs,
directing the major thrust into non-ghetto areas. 10 In order to build lowincome housing in the suburbs, however, the traditional barrier of exclusionary zoning, in all forms, must be overcome.
This note will explore the potential legal challenges to exclusionary
zoning and evaluate their probability of success. The desirability of lowincome housing outside the central city and the nature and operation of
exclusionary devices traditionally utilized to preserve the homogeneous character of the suburbs will also be examined. Following this analysis, the possibility of an affirmative duty to use housing as a means of achieving desegregation will be explored.
DEsIRABILITY OF LOCATING LOW-INCOME HOUSING IN THE SUBURBS

Right to Decent Housing
In examining the interrelationship between low-income housing and
exclusionary zoning, the initial question is whether an enforceable right
to decent housing exists. In this context, the distinction between "the right
to be housed" and the "right to free choice" in housing is useful, since
threats to free choice may arise even when a right to housing is recognized."

7. "When companies move away from a city to a suburb with no living space for bluecollar workers the worker has the option of either traveling to the job from the city or
else quitting. In too many instances, civil rights groups say, 'He's had to quit,' and this
in turn has contributed to unemployment in city areas." Wall Street J., Nov. 27, 1970, at
12, col. 4 (eastern ed.). See also Hilaski & Willacy, Employment Patterns and Place of
Residence, 92 MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1969, at 18-26. But see E. BANF.ELD, TiE UNHEAVENLY
Crry 34-35 (1970).

8. For a history of discrimination in public housing in the United States see Comment,
Public Housing Administration and Discrimination in Federally Assisted Low-Rent Housing,
64 Mcm. L. REv. 871 (1966). For purposes of this note "low-income housing" is intended
to include both public and private sponsored projects, whether apartments, single family
or duplex dwellings, grouped on one site. Likewise there is no necessity to distinguish
among the various housing programs that may be utilized.
9. 'To date, housing programs serving low-income groups have been concentrated in
the ghettos. Non-ghetto areas, particularly suburbs, for the most part have steadfastly
opposed low-income, rent supplement, or below-market interest rate housing, and have
successfully restricted use of these programs outside the ghetto.-' KamE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 482.
10. Id.
11. Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HAni'. Crv.
RiGnTs-Civ. Lm. L. Rav. 207, 215 (1970).
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The importance of decent housing has been recognized in both legislative'2
and executive's pronouncements and the Supreme Court has proclaimed
that "[h]ousing is a necessity of life."1 4 Although these pronouncements seem to
indicate a trend toward favoring a "right to housing," it is still a goal rather
than a fact.' 5 This attention is not misplaced, however, since access to housing has become the vortex about which other rights of the poor and the black
revolve.' 6
If no widely accepted "right" to housing presently exists, can there be
a right to a choice of housing location? Without such a right, the constitutionally guaranteed right to equal protection and due process of law are
meaningless, since the poor may be effectively isolated from the mainstream
of society and denied equal access to jobs and schools. In the absence of
available suburban housing, the mobility of the poor is nonexistent. Trapped
in the cities, the poor find that jobs and educational opportunities are beyond their reach. Thus, the desirability of locating low-income housing in
7
the suburbs is apparent.'
This problem could be partially alleviated by a recognition of the need
for low-income housing in the suburbs. Since 1962 the announced policy of
the federal government has been to eliminate discrimination in federally
assisted housing projects.' 8 The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has adopted regulations requiring, whenever possible, that
HUD projects be located outside areas of racial concentration.' 9 While this
does not necessarily mean public housing will be placed in the suburbs,
it does seem to guarantee - absent special circumstances - that public housing will no longer be constructed exclusively in ghetto areas or urban renewal
neighborhoods. Although the desirability of residential integration by locating public housing in the suburbs has been criticized, 20 it has been en-

12. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1964); Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C.
§1441 (1964); Dep't of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3631 (Supp.
V, 1965-1969); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-31 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
13. E.g., KERNER REPORT, supra note 1, at 467-82; 1 REPORT OF PRsmENr's CoMm. ON
URBAN HOUSING, TECHNICAL STUDIES 27 (1967). See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN
PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1968);
Michelman, supra note 11; Note, Decent Housing as a Constitutional Right- 42 U.S.C.
§1983-Poor People's Remedy for Deprivation, 14 How. L.J. 338 (1968).
14. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921). See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
15. See Michelman, supra note 11, at 215.
16. Abrams, The Housing Problem and the Negro, in THE NEGRO AMEmeAN 512, 520
(T. Parsons & K. Clark eds. 1965). For example, equal employment opportunities are
relatively meaningless when the potential work force is denied housing. See authorities cited
in note 7 supra. But see Note, Constitutional Law - Civil Rights - Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments Applied To Enjoin Referendum on Low Income Housing Project, 15
WAYNE L. REv. 1617, 1621 (1969).
17. See authorities cited in note 7 supra. But cf. E. BANFImLD, supra note 7, at 35-38.
18. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 261 (Supp. 1962).
19. HUD LOW-RENT HOUSING PRECONSTRUCrION HANDBOOK, RHA 7410.1, ch. 1, §1.2g.
20. Hearings on S. 3029 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
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dorsed by recent government advisory committee reports 21 and has been
22
approved by some lower federal courts.
The existence of a right to suburban location is presently being decided.
As yet, however, courts have not found a legally enforceable interest except
in the area of governmentally controlled and subsidized low-income housing.
Generally, government sponsored or supported restrictions on housing choice
are forbidden by both the Constitution2 3 and fair housing legislation 4 - while
25
private discrimination in making housing available is still largely ignored.
Where governmental discrimination involving urban renewal is shown to
exist there apparently is a right not to be relocated in racially dosed housing26 and not to have all public housing sites located in a manner that creates
segregated neighborhoods.27
Although in some instances exclusionary zoning is the result of active
governmental discrimination,28 more frequently the enactment of zoning
restrictions are probably not racially motivated. Instead it is ,the effect rather
than the purpose of the zoning ordinance that is exclusionary. In order to an-

Senate Banking & Currency Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (testimony of Senator Robert
F. Kennedy): "To seek a rebuilding of our urban slums is not to turn our backs on the

goal of integration. It is only to say that open occupancy laws alone will not suffice and that
sensitivity must be shown to the aspirations of Negroes and other non-whites who would
build their own communities and occupy decent housing in the neighborhoods where they
now live.... For it is comparability of housing and full employment that are the keys to
free movement and to the establishment of a society in which each man has a real opportunity to choose whom he will call neighbor." Id. at 641. See Kennedy, Industrial Investment in Urban Poverty Areas, in RAcE mm PovRT" 153, 157 (J. Kain ed. 1969); Piven &
Cloward, Desegregated Housing. Who Pays for the Reformers' Ideal, in RAcE AND PovERTY
175, 181-82 (J. Kain ed. 1969). See also Note, Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 79 YALE L.J. 712 (1970). But ef. Grinstead, Overcoming
Barriers to Scattered-Site Low-Cost Housing, 2 PRosp'xcrus 327 (1969); note 21 infra.
21. E.g., KERNm REPORT, supra note 1, at 481-82; PRESmENT'S COMM. ON URBAN
HousiNG, A DzcENr HoME 13, 48 (1968). See also Kain & Pershey, Alternatives to the Gilded
Ghetto, in RAcE & POVERTY 167 (J. Kain ed. 1969).
22. Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (EJD. La. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969); El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners
Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Authority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1969).
23.

U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, §1.

24. E.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-31 (Supp. IV 1965-1968).
25. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (NJ). IM. 1969),
there was an affirmative showing of governmental discrimination, but it is debatable whether
an extension of the Gautreaux rationale into exclusionary zoning problems is feasible.
There may be a viable distinction here between the "right in" as opposed to the "right to"
public housing. Once housing programs exist, those who participate are entitled to administration of the program free from economic or racial discrimination. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Gonzalez v. Freeman
334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But see Note, supra note 16.
26. E.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 895 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1969). See also Michelman, supra note 11, at 216.
27. Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (NiD. I. 1969).
28. E.g., Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d
321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/4

4

Finch: Low-Income
Housing
in the Suburbs:
The Problem of Exclusionary
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XXrV Zo
alyze the specific devices used to exclude certain groups from suburban
housing, the classes that are the victims of this exclusion -the prospective
tenants in low-income housing-must be examined.
Characteristics of Low-Income Housing Tenants
In 1960, sixty-one per cent of all nonwhite housholds in major metropolitan areas were poor.29 Since only thirty per cent of the urban poor are nonwhite, 0 it would be expected that low-income housing tenants would be
predominantly white. However, this is not the case. Nonwhites occupy over
half of all units in public housing, and more are remaining in public housing.31 The greater mobility of the poor white is partially responsible for the
higher white turnover, which accelerates as the proportion of blacks to whites
increasesA.

2

By comparison, the mobility of blacks is restricted in various ways.
Housing cost is a major stumbling block, as is the hostility of whites in
outlying areas.33 Furthermore, exclusionary zoning practices hinder mobility
by preventing migration to the suburbs for both the white and the nonwhite
poor.3 4 The cumulative effect of the obstacles to suburban migration faced
by the urban poor, especially the black poor, is increased racial segregation
in the cities and the suburbs.3 5 This segregation becomes especially serious
when economic opportunities become concentrated in the suburbs rather
than in the cities3s
Courts have recognized that exclusion from the suburbs effectively reinforces the ghetto.3 7 Since a majority of those residing in low-income housing

29. G. Sc ummt AssoCrATrs, MoPE THAN SHELTER: SocIAL Nmns IN Low- AND MODERATEINcOME HOUSING 34 (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research Rep. No. 8, 1968). Less
than $4,000 family income is the generally accepted monetary definition of poverty. In
comparison, 25% of urban whites were considered poor.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See text accompanying notes 41-49 infra. See also J. VANm ZANDEN, AMERCAN
MNoarry RL.ATIoNs 235 (2d ed. 1966).
34. Grier, The Negro Ghettos and Federal Housing Policy, 32 LAW & CoNTzMP. PROB.
550 (1967). There is a distinct possibility that the relative immobility of low-income
families is denying them access to suburban located housing projects. 22 VAND. L. Rxv. 1386,
1393 (1969). See also Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation
and Impact, 36 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 824, 999 (1968).
35. Black population in Seattle rose over 60% between 1960 and 1970, while in the surrounding county the black population remained negligible. Diuker & Shouldberg, Locational
Analysis of Low Income Housing in Seattle and King County, 1970 URBAN L. ANNUAL 85, 86.
In St. Louis the statistics are even more revealing: between 1950 and 1970 the black population of the city almost doubled, while the white population dropped 54%. See statistics
cited in Complaint, Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, Civ. No. 71C 15(A),
9 (E.D. Mo., filed Jan. 7, 1971). See also KERNER REPORT, supra note I, at 248 (in almost
every city there has been a steady increase in the black percentage of the total).
36. See note 6 supra.
37.

E.g., Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244, 263 A.2d 395, 398 (1970). "[W]hen racial
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are black, and all low-income tenants are by definition poor, the courts
have frequently couched their discussion in terms of racial discrimination.-5

However, the exclusionary effect inexorably operates against white and black
alike. The effect of exclusion is to deny minorities the opportunity to escape
the central city, because they are disproportionately represented among poor
persons 9 needing public housing.40 Suburban residents, aware of the usual
racial composition of low-income groups, have traditionally opposed their
entry into outlying communities.
The Objections of Suburbanites
In resisting any influx of the poor, suburban residents have evolved a
series of seemingly rational reasons for their attitude. Generally, those in
the immediate vicinity of a proposed low-income housing site are most
vocal in opposition, although frequently supported by the remainder of
the community.41 The most persistent objection is that suburban relocation
of the poor will result in decreased property values.42 The fallacy in this
argument, however, is that decline in property value is primarily due to
affected residents who panic upon learning that a site has been selected
discrimination herds men into ghettos ... it too is a relic of slavery." Jones v., Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 892 U.S. 409, 442-43 (1968).
38. E.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 592 US. 409 (1968); Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60 (1917); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669
(W.D.N.Y.), af'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v.
City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla., 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
89. "In . . . 1968 . . . the poverty rate among persons of Negro and other races was
about three times the rate among whites.: U.S. BUREAU OP THE CENSUS, CuRRENr POPULATION
REPORTS, PovERTY IN Tm UNrrm STATES: 1959 TO 1968 1 (ser. P-60, No. 68, 1969). See also
NATIONAL CMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 18, at 45: "In 1957, 51 percent of
the nonwhite population was poor, compared with 12 percent of the white population.
Nonwhites thus constitute a far larger share of the poverty population . . . than of the
American population as a whole ... . Moreover, the nonwhite proportion of the poverty
population has been increasing, slowly but steadily, since the first racial count was made in
1959; it was 28 percent then, and 32 percent by 1967."
40. See text accompanying note 29 supra. See also GoVERNOR'S ADvIsoRY CoMM'N ON
HOUSING PROBLEMS, REPORT ON HOUSING IN CALIORNIA 38-42 (1963); KERNER REPORT, supra
note 1, at 467-74; NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN Crry,
H.R. Doc. No. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1968); PRmMENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING,
A DEcr HOME 42 (1968).
41. In a survey of local housing authorities in Florida over 50% of those responding
listed the hostility of the citizenry in the vicinity of proposed low-income housing sites
as the most serious obstacle to such housing location. (Survey on file with the University
of Florida Law Review.)
42. Id. See Lakewood Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 52 Ohio Op. 2d 218, -,
258 N.E.2d 470, 522 (app. VIII) (C.P. Allen County 1970), modified, 25 Ohio App. 2d
125, 267 N.E.2d 595 (1971); RAYMOND & MAY ASSOCIATES, -ZONING CONTROVERSIES IN THE
SUBURBS: TxmR CAsE STuDms 35-44 (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems Research Rep. No.
11, 1968); Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA.
L REV. 1040, 1067 (1963); Interview with Mr. A. Suskind, Executive Director, Gainesville,
Fla., Housing Authority, Feb. 8, 1971. Cf. W. Kilpatrick, Public Housing in Florida, 1959,
at 13-esults of survey on effect of public housing upon adjacent private housing (unpublished thesis in University of Florida Research Library).
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nearby43 and glut the housing market in their haste to move. The inevitable
consequence is depressed property value. Low-income housing is thus only
the catalyst rather than the effective cause of reduction in realty value.
Implicit in the fear of a drop in property values is the envisioned threat
of friction between black tenants and surrounding white residents. 4" Opposition to an integrated neighborhood merges into opposition to low-income
housing. Other objections include the belief: that housing projects will
place an increased tax burden on neighborhood residents; 4 5 that public
utilities will be inadequate to serve the needs of the new residents; 46 that
neighborhood schools will become overcrowded;4 T that the character of the
community will be altered; 4

and that the projects will become slums.49

These objections have been both the cause and the result of exclusionary
devices that have kept low-income groups out of the suburbs and postponed
the time when assimilation must begin.
THE EXCLUSIONARY DEVICES

The earliest attempts to exclude the poor and the black from suburban
areas took the form of express bans against construction of apartmentsand settlement of blacks.51 Since low-income groups could seldom afford
the cost of a house, the ban on multifamily dwellings generally had the

43. L. LAuIENTi, PROPERTY VALUES AND RAcE 47 (1960); Babcock & Bosselman, supra
note 42, at 1067.
44. Along with depressed property values, friction between the races was the main
objection to locating low-income housing in those communities from which a response
to the survey of local housing authorities in Florida was received. Interview with Mr. A.
Suskind, note 42 supra. Obviously, not all low-income housing is for minority groups.
Especially in Florida, low-income projects for the elderly are also included in low-income
housing construction. The preference for retirement housing in the community underscores
to some extent the racial character of local opposition.
45. See generally Lakewood Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 52 Ohio Op. 2d 213,
-, 258 N.E.2d 470, 522-24 (C.P. Allen County 1970). There is as yet no agreement on
the validity of this objection. See authorities cited in Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 42,
at 1062-65.
46. But see, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970) (rejecting this argument).
47. Lakewood Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 52 Ohio Op. 2d 213, 258 N.E.2d
470 (C.P. Allen County 1970). There is as yet no agreement on the validity of this objection. See authorities cited in Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 42, at 1063 n.161.
48. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Babcock & Bosselman, supra
note 42, at 1067. A community can protect its character by requiring projects to be built
in accordance with reasonable building code requirements.
49. Lakewood Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 52 Ohio Op. 2d 213, 258 N.E.2d
470 (C.P. Allen County 1970). Deterioration of housing may also be prevented through
strict building and occupancy code enforcement. RAYMOND & MAY ASSOCIATES, supra note
42, at 46.
50. E.g., Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 4177, 234 P. 381 (1925); Minkus v.
Pond, 326 Ill. 467, 158 N.E. 121 (1927).
51. E.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Bowen v. Atlanta, 159 Ga. 145, 125
S.E. 199 (1924); Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 103 A. 910 (1918).
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desired effect of preventing the settlement of poor families. A few judges
recognized that the existence of separate districts for single-family and multifamily housing constituted economic segregation. 2 But after zoning by use
districts was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.;53 segregation of multifamily housing was generally accepted. Although occasionally this method of exclusion is accomplished by restricting
multifamily housing to areas where it already exists, 4 the more common
treatment is to establish use districts zoned for multifamily dwellings within
the core city."
Attempts to completely exclude blacks from the suburban community
have been coupled with these controls on apartment location. The earliest
52. R. B. Construction Co. v. Jackson, 152 Md. 671, 187 A. 278 (1927) (Offutt, J.,
dissenting): "The ordinance is nothing more nor less than a vast, comprehensive, and
complete plan or scheme of segregation, under which the population of the city in respect
to their dwelling places are graded and classified according to their means." Id. at 690, 187
A. at 286. See also State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Constr. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1,
174 N.W. 885 (1919), rev'd on rehearing, 176 N.W. 159 (1920); Altschuler v. Scott, 5 N.J.
Misc. 698, 137 A. 883 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Jersey Land Co. v. Scott, 100 N.J.L. 45, 126 A. 173
(Sup. Ct. 1924); Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 285 S.W. 513 (1921).
53. 272 US. 865 (1926).
54. E.g., HAsBROUcK HEiGrs, N.J., ZONING ORDINACE, as amended, Sept. 21, 1955, cited
and construed in Fanale v. Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958): "No
apartment house, or other multiple family dwelling which is arranged, intended or designed
to be used by more than two families shall be erected or used in any zone or district in the
Borough of Hasbrouck Heights." Id. at 328, 139 A.2d at 751. See also Fox Meadow Estates,
Inc. v. Culley, 283 App. Div. 250, 252 N.Y.S. 178 (2d Dep't 1931), aff'd per curiam, 261 N.Y.
506, 185 N.E. 714 (1938) (construing a similar ordinance). But see NErHER PROVUIENcE, PA.,
ZONING ORDINANCE, as amended June 23, 1952, Jan. 19, 1959, cited in Brief for Appellant at
10, Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A-2d 395 (1970) (it was held unconstitutional). For
a current example of tactics being used to exclude low-income groups, see recital of facts
in Complaint, Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, Civ. No. 71C 15 (A) (E.D.
Mo., filed Jan. 7, 1971). See generally Bell, Controlling Residential Development on the
Urban Fringe: St. Louis County, Missouri, 48 J. URBAN L. 409 (1971) for the background of
this complaint.
55. E.g., SrTPuNG, ILL., ZONING ORmNANCE §5 (providing that only single and two-family
houses may be built in residential districts), cited and construed in Speroni v. Board of
Appeals, 368 11. 568, 15 N.E.2d 302 (1938): "While a municipality may not expressly prohibit the erection of apartment buildings or restrict permissible locations to districts unfit
for human habitation or already overcrowded with buildings of a permanent nature, the
record indicates that such is not the effect of the ordinance challenged here. By its provisions, apartment buildings may be built in commercial or industrial districts." Id. at 572,
15 N.E.2d at 304 (emphasis added). See also EucLi, OHIO, ORDINANcE 2812, Nov. 13, 1922,
cited and construed in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 865, 372, 380-82 (1926) (provided for 6 use districts with apartments excluded from the residential district). Use
districts have long been authorized in Florida. "Mhe governing body [of a municipality]
may divide the corporate area of the said municipality into districts of such number, shape,
and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this chapter; and
within such districts it may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction,
alteration, repair or use of buildings, structures, or land. All such regulations shall be
uniform for each class or kind of building throughout each district, but the regulations
in one district may differ from those in other districts." FI.. STAT. §176.03 (1969) (first
enacted in 1939).
56. See generally Abrams, The Housing Problem and the Negro, in THE NEGRo
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efforts took the form of express racial zoning, but in 1917 the Supreme Court,
in Buchanan v. Warley57 held that such explicit restrictions violated the
Constitution. 5 Subsequently, lower federal and state courts have followed
the Buchanan rationale by invalidating zoning laws that blatantly attempt
to prescribe separate areas of residence for whites and blacks.5 9 Although
restrictive covenants are also occasionally utilized,60 suburban communities
rely primarily on zoning to continue the exclusion of the black and the poor.
The most common means of exclusionary zoning is large lot zoning prescribing a minimum lot size.6 1 By inflating residential prices, this zoning
device results in a dual exclusionary effect on low-income housing. By limiting the amount of land available for low-income housing, when housing
project vacancies are filled the poor are forced to select from less desirable
housing available at higher cost.6 2 The supply of low-income housing will

be reduced, thereby excluding the poor from nearby job opportunities. Although a larger lot may not cost proportionately more than a smaller one,
the differential is generally substantial enough to price a large lot beyond
the reach of many prospective purchasers.63 More overt economic discrimination, such as minimum housing cost rather than lot size restrictions, has

AMERICAN 512, at 516 (T. Parsons & K. Clark eds. 1965); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DII.EMMA,
623-24 (anniv. ed. 1962).
57. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
58. Id. at 80-81.
59. City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
940 (1951); State v. Wilson, 157 Fla. 342, 25 So. 2d 860 (1946); Clinard v. Winston-Salem,
217 N.C. 119, 6 S.E.2d 867 (1964); Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P.2d 1054
(1936).
60. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding such racial covenants
violate equal protection).
61. Compare ordinances cited and construed in County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355,
228 A.2d 450 (1967) (5 acres valid); State ex -el. Grant v. Kiefaber, 114 Ohio App. 279, 181
N.E.2d 905 (6th Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (2 acres valid) (dicta), with, e.g., Aronson v. Town of
Sharon, 246 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964) (100,000 sq. ft., with width of 200 ft., un-

constitutional as applied); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965) (4 acres unconstitutional). See cases cited in Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 716, 761 (1964).
See generally I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §7.29 (1968). Minimum floor space
requirements are a similar means of regulating entry to an area, by controlling the size of
the structure rather than the lot size. E.g., Lionshead Lake Inv. v. Township of Wayne, 10
N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (minimum floor space
requirements upheld). See cases collected in Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1409 (1964). Minimum lot
size regulations have been upheld in Florida where the restriction is "reasonable." Garvin
v. Baker, 59 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1952).
62. Additionally, the absence of low-income housing may also perpetuate segregation,
since racial minorities are disproportionately represented in low-income groups. See text
accompanying notes 29-32 supra. See also Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 781-82 (1969).
63. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (1968).
See also Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970). Additionally,
incidental effects of low-density zoning, such as increased land improvement costs and informal building practices, militate against low-income groups.
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seldom been utilized64 and probably would not be allowed. 65 The effects of

such practices on low-income housing are only slightly less substantial than
on private buyers. Consequently, as vacant land within central metropolitan areas becomes increasingly, scarce, 66 the over-all effect of suburban
zoning has been to constrict urban growth 67 and to interpose a serious obstacle to the suburban location of low-income groups. 68

Attempts to circumvent, or even to comply with, local zoning requirements have been further complicated by referendum and initiative petitions.

By either forcing approval by petition6s9 of a large percentage of the zoning
board, or relegating the issue to the people of the community by way of a
referendum,7 local zoning decisions controversial enough to raise opposition may be singled out for special consideration. Since the introduction of
low-income housing is almost certain to arouse significant opposition among
area residents,71 the referendum becomes a potent hurdle to locating lowincome housing in the suburbs.
Other problems may further complicate and impede construction of lowincome housing. The most common is discrimination in site selection within
the community.7 2 Assuming that local zoning problems have been overcome,

64. Compare County Comm'rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946) ($2,500
minimum housing cost questioned but not reached), with Benequit v. Monmouth Beach,
125 N.J.L. 65, 66-67, 13 A.2d 846, 847 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (construing minimum cost of building
without reaching constitutionality), and Cassell v. Lexington Township, 163 Ohio St. 840,
127 N.E.2d 11 (1955) (no minimum cost allowed where not pursuant to comprehensive

plan).
65. See Barkerville v. Town of Montclair, Docket No. L-35387-68 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct.,
Mar. 30, 1970), cited in Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning
of the End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANNUAL 9, 38 (1971) (first dear holding that minimum construction cost for residential zoning is illegal because unrelated to the health, safety, or general
welfare of the community). An analogous situation is acreage zoning. See, e.g., Simon v.
Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 NE.2d 516 (1942); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown, 419
Pa. 604, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). But see Florida Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo.
1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (1952).
66. See Note, supra note 63, at 908.
67. See text accompanying notes 29-40 supra.
68. In the survey of housing authorities in Florida, local zoning was cited as a major
obstacle to location of low-income housing outside areas of racial concentration. (Survey on file
with the University of Florida Law Review.)
69. E.g., F.A. STAT. §176.06 (1969); GAr .svILI., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §29-21 (1960),
as amended, Ordinance 1090, June 25, 1962, and Ordinance 1346, Sept. 8, 1965. Such provisions have generally been upheld. See, e.g., Koppel v. City of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710,
371 P.2d 113 (1962); Northwood Properties Co. v. Perkins, 325 Mich. 419, 39 N.W.2d 25
(1949); Farmer v. Meeker, 63 N.J. Super. 56, 163 A.2d 729 (Super. Ct. 1960).
70. See, e.g., Valtierra v. Housing Authority of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D.
Cal. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Jaiiies v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Ranjel v. City of
Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 980 (1970). Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
71. See text accompanying notes 41-49 supra. See generally Wolfinger & Greenstein, The
Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 Am. PoL.
Sc. REv. 753 (1968); 1969 L. & SocIAL ORDER 453.
72. See generally Note, Povei ty Law - Constitutional Law - Selection of Sites for Public
Housing, 48 N.C.L. Rlv. 155 (1969); Note, Discriminatory Site Selection in Public Housing
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local officials charged with ultimate approval may yet veto sites in all-white
73
areas.
Site acquisition may impose additional problems, since potential sellers
may be reluctant to sell property for use as low-income housing sites. *While
the power of eminent domain is sometimes available to acquire land for public housing,7 4 condemnation proceedings often generate ill will within the
community and therefore may not be practical for land acquisition.75
Although the exclusion devices already discussed frequently arise in the
path of attempts to provide low-income housing; the more prevalent barriers
have been local low density zoning ordinances. The following discussion
is directed to methods thus far used to remove such zoning requirements,
through both legislation and litigation.
EQUAL PROTECTION ATACKS

The Standard of Review
In determining whether governmental action violates equal protection,
two basic standards of review have emerged- the "state interests" and the

"rigid scrutiny" tests 7 6 Under the more common state interest criterion, state

and Federal Judicial Response, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 720 (1969); Note, Racial Discrimination
in Public Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REv. 63 (1970); Note, Public Housing and
Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 79 YALE L.J. 712 (1970).
73. Under federal and state laws, experts from the local governing body, the local
housing authority, and the federal government must independently consider project plans
and determine not only that the project is needed and wanted, but also that it is well
planned, feasible as to cost and size, and complies with myriad technical requirements.
See 42 U.S.C. §§1415(7) (a) (i), (iii), (b)(i) (1964); HUD Low RENT HousING PREcoNsraUarIoN HANDBOoK, RHA 7410.1, ch. 4, §2. Compare Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619
(E.D. La. 1969), and Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (ND. Ill.
1969), with Thompson v. Housing Authority of City of Miami, 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla.
1966). For a history of discrimination in public housing, see Comment, Public Housing
Administration and Discrimination in Federally Assisted Low-Rent Housing, 64 Micn. L.
REv. 871 (1966).
74. Condemnation of land for housing is generally considered a public purpose for the
requirements of eminent domain. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Marvin v.
Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 138 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1988). But cf. FLA. STAT. §421.13
(1969) (all housing projects subject to the zoning ordinances applicable to the locality).
Compare, on federal level, United States v, Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, 78
F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935) (Public Works Authority held not to have the power to use
eminent domain to acquire land for low-cost housing), with City of Cleveland v. United
States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945) (acquisition of land for low-cost housing not necessarily only
a local function). See generally Grinstead, Overcoming Barriers to Scattered-Site Low-Cost
Housing,2 PRosPEcTus 327, 341-45 (1969).
75. Interview with Mr. A. Suskind, Executive Director, Gainesville, Fla. Housing
Authority, Feb. 8, 1971. Building permit procedures may also impede the construction of
low-income projects. See generally Comment, Restriction of Building Permits as a Means
for Controlling the Rate of Community Development, 2 URBAN L. ANNUAL 184 (1969).
76. See generally Sager, supra note 62; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 353-61 (1949); Note, Low-Income Housing and the
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action is presumed valid unless a discriminatory intent 77 or the absence of
a rational relation to any permissible public purpose can be shown.7 This
test is usually employed when economic regulation is under attack.79
However, where a legislative classification is based upon a "suspect"
trait80 or affects "fundamental interests,"81 a more rigorous standard will be
applied .2 Non-benign3 classifications based on race bear an extraordinary
burden of justification.84 While classification based on wealth could also
be termed highly suspect,8 5 generally such classification has been regarded
only as "traditionally disfavored,"6 and has not been equated with racial
classifications.87 Several criminal cases have held, however, that ability to
pay as a classification criterion may be impermissible where fundamental
interests are affected88 In addition, while of some effect, the fact that there
is no express or implied intent to discriminate against the poor or the black
is not determinative.9 Intent or lack of intent may be irrelevant where the

Equal Protection Clause, 56 CoaREm L. Rv. 343, 344-48 (1971); Note, Snob Zoning: Must
a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 Mren. L. Ray. 339, 342-50 (1970); Note, Zoning. Closing the
Economic Gap, 43 TaMPax L.Q. 347, 353-56 (1970); 118 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 439-43 (1970).
77. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discrimination against Chinese
aliens).
78. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S.
141 (1940).

79. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 US. 483 (1955). Under this test the
Supreme Court gives great deference to legislative classifications. Only once in the past 30
years, in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), has economic legislation been invalidated under

the "rationality" test.
80. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (wealth suspect when

qualification for voting); Korematsu v. United States, 323 US. 214, 216 (1944) (race
suspect).
81. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618, 638 (1969) (right of interstate movement);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964) (right to vote). Cf. Note, Snob Zoning, supra

note 76, at 344 n.35.
82. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 US.
214, 216 (1944).
83. Where racial classifications are used to achieve equality through preferential treat.
ment to groups previously the object of discrimination, they have been termed "benign."
E.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir.
1968). See generally Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and "The Rule in
Shelley's Case,"-17 RuTmERs L. REv. 531 (1963); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World:
Equality for the Negro- The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1966).
84. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 US.
184 (1964).
85. McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). Wealth "would independently
render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny."
Id. at 807.
86. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
87. See Sager, supra note 62, at 785-87. But see Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey:
A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SuP. Cr. REv. 39, 75.
88. Tate v. Short, 401 US. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 US. 235 (1970); Anders
v. California, 386 US. 738 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v.

Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
89. Express or implied intent to discriminate, however, may make it easier to strike
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effect of the ordinance is economically and racially discriminatory."
Using the traditional "state interests" equal protection standard, a successful equal protection attack upon low density zoning ordinances seems
unlikely. 91 Control of population density has long been recognized as a valid
state objective, 92 and zoning appears to be a rational response to this end.
As a result, the state interests test would seem insufficient to overturn local
zoning. The alternative test for measuring a challenge to exclusionary zoning, the rigid scrutiny standard, appears to offer potentially greater success.
The Supreme Court has recognized that housing is a fundamental interest, 93
having a direct effect on other fundamental rights. In viewing this recognition in conjunction with the classification by wealth engendered by
exclusionary zoning, 94 and with the racial composition of low-income
groups, 9 the rigid scrutiny test may indeed prove applicable. 96 Additionally,
the effect of exclusionary zoning on freedom of movement, another recogdown the ordinance. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318
F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037
(10th Cir. 1970).
90. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507-08 (D.D.C. 1967); Ranjel v.
City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301, 312 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970). The landmark equal protection decisions have emphasized effect rather than intent. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (anti-open
housing provision struck); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll
tax unconstitutional); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1958) (indigent defendants entitled to
free transcript).
91. Low density zoning .ordinances include such restrictions as minimum acreage or
lot size, minimum housing cost, and exclusion of multifamily dwellings.
92. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
93. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921); cf. Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring): "Miserable and disreputable housing
conditions may do more than spread disease and immorality. They may also suffocate
the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed
make living an almost insufferable burden." Id. at 32.
94. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
96. Since a finding of intent may be practically impossible in many circumstances, the
rigid scrutiny test would appear to be the more justifiable approach. When dealing with
a long-standing low density zoning ordinance, it will be difficult to show a discriminatory
intent. Where a recent change in the ordinance-especially through local referendum-is
involved, a finding of discrimination may be more readily ascertainable (Dailey v. City of
Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266, 268-69 (W.D. Okla. 1969), afJ'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970)),
though not compelled. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City,
314 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). Moreover, the motives of
legislators and voters, or both, may conflict or be difficult to prove. As the Supreme Court
has stated, however, the fourteenth amendment "nullifies sophisticated as wel as simpleminded modes of discrimination." But even though unlikely, such admissions may occur.
See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (admissions of city officials facilitated a finding of denial of equal protection). Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961) where the Court stated: "It is of no consolation to an individual denied the equal
protection of the laws that it was done in good faith." Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
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nized fundamental interest, 97 may operate to invoke this more exacting standard of review.
Application of Equal Protection
While ithe Supreme Court has not yet directly confronted exclusionary
low-density zoning, lower federal courts have increasingly utilized an equal
protection rationale in striking ordinances having an exclusionary effect on
low-income groups9 8 In Dailey v. City of Lawton 99 the district court found
the refusal of local officials to rezone property to permit construction of a
low-rent housing project to be racially motivated.:1 0 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that failure to show racial prejudice on the
part of officials would not have been fatal.10 However, the court attached
considerable weight to the finding of racial motivation in affirming the district court, 02 indicating that discriminatory intent is an important element
03
of proof, even where the discrimination alleged is racial rather than economic.
Where no discriminatory motivation can be shown, equal protection advocates have pointed to the effect of the zoning ordinance. It was precisely
this problem that occupied the New York federal district court in Kennedy
Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna.04 The Lackawanna city
council had amended its zoning ordinance to rezone land originally intended
for use as a low-income housing development site; it was rezoned for exclusive use as a park and recreation area. Using a modified rigid scrutiny
equal protection standard, the court held the effect of such action was to
deny equal protection to low-income groups. 0 5 The fact that sewage problems would thereby be aggravated was held not to be sufficient state interest to overcome the need to plan for the 'housing needs of all residents of the
city.106

97. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Edwards. v. California, 814
U.S. 160 (1941) (arbitrary exclusion of indigents from the state constituted denial of
equal protection).
98. E.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 818 F. Supp. 669
(W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v.
City of awton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
99. 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
100. 296 F. Supp. at 268-69.
101. 425 F.2d at 1089. "If proof of a civil right [sic] violation depends on an open statement by an official of any intent to discriminate, the Fourteenth Amendment offers little
solace to those seeking its protection." Id.
102. Id. at 1039-40.
103. See also Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, Case No.
51590 (N.D. Cal. July g0, 1970) (on remand from 9th Cir.); Thompson v. Housing Authority
of City of Miami, 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
104. 818 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401

U.S. 1010 (1971).
105. 318 F. Supp. at 695.
106. Id. at 697. Cf. Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir.
1961) (community conspiracy to condemn land for public park to prevent construction of
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On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, stressing that almost all black
residents of the city were concentrated in one ward.107 Examining the circumstances, the court found substantial evidence to support the charge of discrimination. The rezoning and the failure to provide improved sewage facilities, despite recommendations to the contrary by city planners, constituted
"specific authorization and continuous encouragement of racial discrimination, if not almost complete racial segregation."'' 0 To justify such action
the court required that the city show a compelling governmental interest. 0 9
Upon failure to present such a showing, the actions of the city were held
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds."10 Inadvertent discrimination was determined to be no defense, for the city could not place its
minorities at a severe disadvantage without justification.", The importance

of the Kennedy Park Homes decision is its application of a more rigorous
equal protection standard where no clearly enunciated discriminatory intent
was apparent. The resulting discrimination was sufficient to require the city
to demonstrate some compelling interest to overcome the presumption of
unconstitutionality.112
The problem in applying Kennedy Park Homes to exclusionary zoning
-in general is that in the New York case the city had taken specific discriminatory action, both by rezoning the land and by declaring a moratorium on
low-income housing construction. Usually, existing ordinances may adequately bar the ingress of low-income groups. Moreover, zoning regulations
frequently will have totally excluded low-income groups from all parts of
a community, not just confined them to one area. However, such distinctions
should not affect the applicability of the Kennedy Park Homes rationale,
since in either case the effect is the same.
The general thrust of the Second Circuit's decision is that the rigid
scrutiny equal protection standard should be applied to governmental action that places a minority group under a "severe disadvantage." Since any
exclusionary zoning ordinance constitutes a heavy burden on low-income
groups, the same standard may apply to all such exclusionary zoning ordinances. Whether the rigid scrutiny standard will always be applied is uncertain, however, especially in view of a recent decision by the Supreme Court
involving referendums as an exclusionary device. 113

integrated housing development); G & D Holland Constr. Co. v. City of Marysville, 12 Cal.
App. 3d 989, 994, 91 Cal. Rptr. 227, 230 (1970) (only a chimeral connection between
problem of sewage and population density).
107. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 110 (2d Cir.

1970).
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113

Id. at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 80-90 supra.
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See text accompanying notes 132-149 infra.
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Special Problems Involving Referendum Zoning
The use of the referendum as a means of barring "undesirables" from
the community is a somewhat specialized exclusionary device 14 that has
increasingly confronted lower federal courts. Referendum zoning, which
requires the holding of an election prior to the construction of low-income
housing, arguably places a greater burden on minorities by making them
vulnerable to the whim of the majority."1 5 Since such provisions commonly
are required where minority housing is involved, they would appear to deny
minorities equal protection."- The initial Supreme Court decisions indicated
this might indeed be the case.
In Reitman v. Mulkey' the Supreme Court held that a California constitutional provision, in effect, authorized racial discrimination and was thus
unconstitutional where it repealed fair housing laws and provided for a referendum before enactment of any new fair housing statute., 8 In Hunter v.
Erickson- 9 the Court invalidated a provision of the Akron, Ohio, city charter
requiring a referendum before enactment of any anti-discrimination legislation because its effect was to make enactment of legislation for minorities
more difficult than for others. 2 Futhermore, the impact of the law fell
squarely on minorities.21 Although the Hunter and Reitman decisions involved racial discrimination, their rationale was interpreted by lower federal
courts as also proscribing economic discrimination.
Early lower court decisions discounted motive as the governing factor
in determining whether equal protection was being denied low-income
groups. In Raniel v. City of Lansing 2 2 a Michigan federal district court
114. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
115. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 40Z U.S. 137 (1971) (referendum before construction
of low-income housing); Hunter v. Erickson, 893 U.S. 385 (1969) (referendum before antidiscrimination legislation could be enacted); Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir.
1968) (anti-discrimination legislation subject to referendum).
116. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
117. 387 US. 369 (1967).
118. Id. The California supreme court had dismissed a writ of mandamus to keep the
proposed amendment off the ballot, finding that it would be more appropriate to pass on
the legality after the election rather "than . . .interfere with the power of the people to
propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject the same at the
polls." Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 529, 535, 413 P.2d 825, 829 (1966).

119. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
120. Id. at 390-91.
121. "[A]lthough the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an
identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority. The majority
needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum might be bothersome but no more than that." Id. at 391. Popular sovereignty was also held subject to
constitutional limitations. "[IMnsisting that a State may distribute legislative power as it
desires and that the people may retain for themselves the power over certain subjects may
generally be true, but these principles furnish no justification for a legislative structure
which otherwise would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the implementation
of this change through popular referendum immunize it." Id. at 392.
122. 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,

397 U.S. 980 (1970).
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found racial motivation behind a referendum challenging the rezoning of a
residential district to permit low-rent housing and held that it consequently
was a denial of equal protection. 1 23 The Sixth Circuit disagreed, however.
On appeal, it was held that "if the electors had a legal right to a referen'
dum, their motive in exercising that right would be immaterial."124
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization [SASSO] v. Union City,1 25 confronted the referendum issue
when a city-wide vote had nullified a city ordinance rezoning a tract of land
to permit construction of a federally financed housing project. 126 The court
rejected the argument that referendum zoning violated constitutional provisions by subjecting zoning decisions to the bias and self-interest of the
voters.1 27 Like the Ranjel court, it refused to inquire into the motives behind the referendum. 28 Other courts, however, have not exhibited similar
reluctance. 1 29 Generally, repeal of existing ordinances is not in itself sufficient but - if coupled with a clearly discriminatory effect - may be suf30
ficient to indicate denial of equal protection.1
Where no discriminatory motivation can be shown, advocates of the
equal protection argument point to the exclusionary effect of the referendum.
After failing to find any discriminatory motives behind the rejection of a
low-income housing referendum in SASSO, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
that a substantial constitutional issue remained. 13
The issue posed in SASSO was squarely presented in Valtier'a v. Housing
Authority of San Jose.' 2 In that case, low-income plaintiffs challenged a
California constitutional provision 133 requiring approval of any low-rent hous-

123. 293 F. Supp. at 312.
124. 417 F.2d at 324. This seems clearly mistaken in view of Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969). See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
125. 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
126. Id. at 292.
127. Id. at 294.
128. Id. at 295.
129. E.g., Holmes v. Leadbetter, 294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Otey v. Common
Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968); cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
130. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking
Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417
F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969).
131. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291
(9th Cir. 1970). "Surely, if the environmental benefits of land use planning are to be
enjoyed by a city and the quality of life of its residents is accordingly to be improved,
the poor cannot be excluded from enjoyment of the benefits. Given the recognized importance of equal opportunities in housing, it may well be, as a matter of law, that it is
the responsibility of a city and its planning officials to see that the city's plan as initiated
or as it develops accommodates the needs of its low-income families, who usually - if not
always - are members of minority groups." Id. at 295-96.
132. 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd sub nom., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971).

133. CAL. CoNsr. art. XXXIV.
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ing project by a majority of the qualified municipal electors.3 4 The district
court, relying on the Hunter v. Erickson rationale, 35 held that the effect
of the provision was to impose "an impermissible burden which constitutes
a substantial and invidious denial of equal protection" on legislation for
the poor. 3 6 The court used the more rigorous equal protection standard
to arrive at its conclusion. 37 As in Kennedy Park Homes v. City of Lackawanna, 3s the argument that the provision was not motivated by discrimination was insufficient justification. 3 9 The district court was thus willing
to declare discrimination in access to housing a sufficiently fundamental interest to invoke the stringent rigid scrutiny equal protection test.
On appeal, 14° the United States Supreme Court reversed. Writing for
a 5-3 majority, Justice Black asserted that "[p]rovisions for referendum
demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice."'' Emphasizing that referendum laws had long been used in California, the Court held that "[t]his procedure for democratic decision-making
does not violate the constitutional command that no State shall deny to any
person the 'equal protection of the law'."' 42 The referendum permitted local
residents to participate in decisions that would increase local expenditures
for public services, lower tax revenues, and affect future community development. 43 Since the basic thrust of the fourteenth amendment was to prohibit
legal distinctions based on race'" and the questioned provision contained
no racial classification, the Court could find no evidence indicating that
the California law was directed at any racial minority. 45 While the district
court had relied primarily on Hunter v. Erickson140 to support its finding
of discrimination,' 47 the Supreme Court did not consider that case persuasive, since in Hunter the referendum dealt with racial, not economic, discrimination.I 5 The Court emphasized, however, that in California referen-

134. 313 F. Supp. at 2.
135. 393 U.. 385 (1969) (Akron, Ohio, ordinance requiring approval of voters before
enactment of any fair housing ordinance declared unconstitutional).
136. Valtierra v. Housing Authority of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
137. Id. at 4.

138. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970).
139. Valtierra v. Housing Authority of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
"[A]lthough proof of bad motive may help to prove discrimination, lack of bad motive
has never been held to cure an otherwise discriminatory scheme."
140. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
141. Id. at 143.
142. Id.
143. Both appellants and appellees agreed that the building of federally financed lowcost housing entails costs to the community. Id. at 143 n.4.
144. Id. at 140-41, citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 US. 385, 391-92 (1969).
145. Id. at 141. Appellees had argued that the racial composition of low-income groups
was sufficient to allow the inference that the referendum requirement, while couched in
broad language, was aimed at racial minorities. Brief for Appellees at 62-68.

146. 393 US. 385 (1969).
147.

Valtierra v. Housing Authority of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1970).

148. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
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dums were not limited to issues involving public housing, but were also required for other subjects.149
While the Valtierra decision is certain to influence future equal protection attacks on referendum zoning, there are possible distinctions that may
avoid its full impact. Since the California constitutional provision involved
was adopted in 1950, before residential segregation was a legal issue, the
0
Court's finding that it was not racially motivated is more easily defensible.15
Thus, even though several other states already have similar statutory provisions,'51 any wholesale adoption of referendum zoning after Valtierra may
not be accorded the same deference by the courts as was the California provision.
Possibly more significant as a basis for distinction in future equal protection challenges is the absence in Valtierra of a showing of racial motivation in the California referendum requirement.5 - Implicit in the decision
is the possibility that if a racially discriminatory motive can be demonstrated,
an equal protection attack will be more favorably received. If indeed the
Court is willing to consider motive as well as effect, it marks a significant
departure from the lower court decisions.5 s Apparently, however, the Court
is not willing to apply the rigid scrutiny standard where the discrimination
is economic rather than racial. Whether this will be extended to other
forms of exclusionary zoning is as yet unclear. Although the immediate effect
of the decision will probably be to impede equal protection attacks against
all modes of exclusionary zoning directed against low-income groups, its
application to other methods is at least questionable, since they do not employ the same "democratic decisionmaking" favored in Valtierra. Even so, the
Court's decision severely restricts the application of an equal protection
rationale by implying that economic classifications are not inherently suspect.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Balancing the interests of the municipality in community planning against
interests of the individual landowner has traditionally constituted the general
149. Id. at 142. The three dissenting justices would have utilized the "rigid scrutiny"
equal protection standard to strike the referendum provision, contending that poverty as
a classification was no less suspect than race. "It is far too late in the day to contend that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only racial discrimination; and . . . singling out
the poor to bear a burden not placed on any other class of citizens tramples the values
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect." Id. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. In 1950 residential segregation per se had not yet been seriously challenged. But,
on the other hand, there were indications that it might be the subject of litigation in the
future, since the Supreme Court had outlawed racially restrictive covenants two years
earlier. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Whether this decision was in part the impetus behind adoption of the California referendum provisions is an open question.
151. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §403A.25 (Supp. 1971); MISS. CODE ANN. §7322-22-24 (Supp.
1969); cf. FLA. STAT. §163.440 (1969) (referendum to determine applicability of community
redevelopment act).
152. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
153. See, e.g., Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 4
1971]

1EXCLUSIONARY ZONINO

basis for reviewing zoning ordinances. The rights of those whose access to
the area is barred by such zoning have not been considered.1 54 The standard formula for upholding zoning ordinances against due process attacks
has been a "[s]ubstandial relation to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare"' 55 test, which places the burden on the questioning party to
show that no substantial relation exists.15 The problem with such a presumption of validity, couched in a limited standard of reviewability, is
that it effectively precludes challenge by outsiders' 57 and presents a formidable obstacle even for individual property owners. 58 Consequently, a due
process attack on exclusionary zoning has seldom been attempted.
Due process has been used, however, where the purposes behind enactment of the zoning ordinance have not borne a substantial relation to the
general welfare, especially where restrictions indicate an attempt to bar
"undesirables" from a particular area. Holding that the purpose behind
the restriction was to exclude low-income groups, the Virginia supreme court
in Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper"59 found a twoacre minimum lot size requirement invalid. The court cited evidence showing that applications for subdivisions had virtually halted with the passage
of the ordinance.1 60 Such an ordinance, according to the court, bore no relation to the general welfare.' 8 ' Likewise, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania overturned a four-acre minimum lot size requirement in National
Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 6 2
finding -that the primary purpose was to exclude newcomers. 6

F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1970); Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 1969).
154. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 784 (1969). See also Note, Standing To Appeal Zoning Determinations:
The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1070 (1966); Note, The "Aggrieved
Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 294 (1967).

155. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). See also Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
156. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); State ex rel. Helseth v.
DuBose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930).
157. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 154, at 784.
158. Note, Zoning. Closing the Economic Gap, 43 TzMPLa L.Q. 347 (1970). "Mndividuals wishing to challenge such an ordinance have been forced to present extensive evidence showing that the municipal action is unconstitutionally arbitrary or unreasonable.
The effect of this has been to discourage zoning attacks, since few plaintiffs can afford
the extensive factual research required to carry the burden of proof." Id.
159. 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
160. Id. at 661, 107 S.E.2d at 396.
161. Id. "The practical effect of the amendment is to prevent people in the low income
bracket from living in the western areas [where the two-acre restriction applied] and
forcing them into the eastern area, thereby reserving the western area for those who could
afford to build houses on two acres or more. This would serve private rather than public
interests. Such an intentional and exclusionary purpose would bear no relation to the
health, safety, morals, prosperity and general welfare." Id. Discrimination in zoning a
particular tract may likewise be invalid. E.g., G. & D. Holland Constr. Co. v. City of Marysville, 12 Cal. App. 3d 989, 91 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1970).
162. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
163. Id. at 527-28, 215 A.2d at 610.
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Proof of a discriminatory motive is impossible in most instances and,
therefore, due process objections generally would appear -to be ineffectual.
Recent Pennsylvania cases, however, suggest that a redefinition of the general welfare test may be evolving. While invalidating a two-acre minimum
lot size requirement as more than "necessary,' '164 the Pennsylvania supreme
court rejected a strict factual examination of the community's present development as determinative of the ordinance's validity.165 If consistently followed, the Pennsylvania approach would greatly facilitate acquisition of land
for low-income housing projects. Standard arguments voiced by local residents would be of little significance in determining necessary size.
Even more important for prospective low-income housing builders and
tenants is the decision in Appeal of Girsh.166 In that case, the Pennsylvania
supreme court held that failure to provide for apartments anywhere in the
township of Nether Providence was unconstitutional, even though multiunit developments were not explicitly prohibited. 1 67 A private developer had
purchased property zoned for single family residences and sought to have
the zoning ordinance amended to permit construction of a high rise apartment project. When the requested change was denied, the developer appealed, challenging the validity of the zoning ordinance. The court reversed
a lower court decision upholding the ordinance, emphasizing the limiting
effect on the influx of new citizens.118
The conclusion that a failure to zone for apartments is unreasonable
per se indicates that the burden of persuasion has been shifted to the municipality.69 In Girsh the developer stressed that his project would involve
luxury apartments, thus attracting "high class" residents into the town.'"
Whether the court was impressed with this argument is unclear, but in the
opinion no emphasis is placed on the type of apartment involved. Lowincome developments, either apartments, single-family or duplex houses, are
arguably included. Although the Girsh requirement that there be a "reasonable accommodation" for various types of housing is not wholly satisfactory,'7' it is preferable to the previously applied standard. 7 2 It represents
an expansion of the general welfare definition to include outsiders as well as
property owners and the municipality. If other courts are willing to adopt

164. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
165. Id. The "present community development" criteria regarded in Kit-Mar was initially applied in the "substantial relation" formula of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
166. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). See generally Washburn, Apartments in the
Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 DicK. L. REv. 634 (1970).
167. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 246, 263 A.2d 395, 397 (1970).
168. Id. at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99.
169. The municipality must show the absence to be reasonable if the ordinance is to
be upheld. Compare Girsh, with text accompanying note 155 supra. See Aloi & Goldberg,
Racial and Economic Zoning: The Beginning of the End, 1971 URBAN L. ANNUAL 9, 44

(1971).
170. Brief for Appellant at 33, 38, 46, Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
171. Note, supra note 158, at 353.
172. See note 165 supra.
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this approach, substantive due process may be established as an effective and
7s
potent attack on exclusionary zoning.'
Moreover, Girsh recognized the necessity for a more regional approach
to zoning as a means of avoiding exclusionary effects altogether. 4 While
the concept of zoning as being a regional rather than a wholly municipal
function isnot new, it is only now beginning to be recognized as an important device in dealing with exclusionary zoning. For some time courts have
been willing to examine the effect of zoning on an adjacent municipality,
requiring that the adjoining uses be considered.'7 5 Recently this examination
has been extended to a regional level., 6 The Girsh court illustrates the result brought about by this broader view. Recognizing the dangers inherent
in parochial zoning ordinances 77 ,the court found that outlying municipalities should not be allowed to isolate themselves from urban migration:7 5
Perhaps in an ideal world, planning and zoning would be done on a
regional basis, so that a given community would have apartments,
while an adjoining community would not. But as long as we allow
zoning to be done community by community, it is intolerable to allow
one municipality (or many municipalities) to close its doors at the
expense of surrounding communities and the central city.
Stated in terms of Girsh, the issue essentially becomes whether those who
first settle a suburban community have the right to stifle further growth
through exclusionary zoning. The Supreme Court as early as 1926 held that
instances might arise "[w]here the general public interest would so far out-

175. Where exclusionary zoning is at issue, shifting the burden of showing a suident
connection from the individual challenging the zoning ordinance to the municipality defending it would seem to fit within expansion of the "general welfare" requirement. But
cf. cases cited note 156 supra.
174. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244, 263 A.2d 395, 398-99 (1970).
175. E.g., LaSalle Nat'1 Bank v. City of Chicago, 4 Ill. 2d 253, 122 N.E.d 519 (1954);
Hutting v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 8 3 (Mo. 1963); Chusud Realty Corp. v.
Village of Kensington, 22 App. Div. 2d 895, 255 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dep't 1964). See also Note,
Regional Development and the Courts, 16 SYACUsE L. Rav. 600 (1965); Note, Zoning:
Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 107, 108-15 (1965). But see City
of Little Rock v. Sun Bldg. & Dev. Co., 199 Ark. 333, 134 S.W.2d 582 (1939); City of Los
Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954); Gruber v. Mayor & Township
Comm'n, 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962) (holding that the general welfare refers solely to
the needs of the area doing the zoning).
176. Kunzler v. Hoffman, 48 N.J. 277, 225 A. d 321 (1966). "Although municipalities in
their consideration of use variances have not yet been compelled to recognize values that
transcend municipal lines, they certainly should be encouraged to consider regional needs
and be supported by the courts when they do so for sound reasons." Id. at 287, 225 A.2d
at 326. See Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J, 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954);
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land c Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). But cf. Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 237 Md. 398, 206 A2d
678 (1965) (no need to look to adjoining uses when dealing with undeveloped lands).
177. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d 895, 398-99 (1970).
178. Id. at 245 n.4, 263 A.2d at 399 n.4. See generally Haar, Regionalsm and Realism
in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957); Note, Zoning Against the Public
Welfare: Judicial Limitations on Municipal Parochialism,71 YAL.E L.J. 720 (1962).
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weigh the interest of -the municipality that the municipality would not be
allowed to stand in the way.' 17 9 Girsh made this long-ignored warning the
basis of its decision, indicating that substantive due process is potentially
an effective attack, operating within the zoning system. If other communities
fail to redefine the concepts of "general public interest" or "general welfare" in broader terms, fresh challenges are imminent.18s
SUPREMACY

CLAUSE

AS A

POSSIBLE CHALLENGE

Although application of the Supremacy Clause' 8 ' has generally been restricted to situations in which alternative remedies have been exhausted or
are inapplicable,182 it has been relied upon to supplement equal protection
and due process' 83 challenges to zoning that affect federally funded lowincome housing projects. Since Housing and Urban Development provisions
state that sites for low-rent housing should be located outside areas of racial
concentration of minority groups, 84 the argument has been that federal
policy has impliedly dictated that zoning cannot be used as a bar. While
zoning ordinarily does not exclude public housing specifically, it accomplishes
the same result through low-density requirements that make it impossible
to build units that comply with prescribed regulations. Alternatively, the
local government may rezone an area intended as a low-income housing site
for another use.8 5
In addition to HUD's low-rent housing manual, 86 various legislation
indicates a similar congressional intent.8s The district court in Ranjel v.
179. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
180. Since this note was sent to the printer, a state court has struck a New Jersey
community's entire zoning ordinance because it excluded low-income families. Wall Street J.,
Nov. 1, 1971, at 18, cols. 2, 3. For an account of the most recent developments see Waters,
The Battle of the Suburbs, NEWSWEEK, Nov, 15, 1971, at 61.
181. U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2.
182. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (only applied when there is a
conflict between federal law and an otherwise valid state enactment).
183. Valtierra v. Housing Authority of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd
sub nom., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp.
301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970); Hicks
v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969); El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners
Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Authority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1969).
184. "The aim of a Local Authority in carrying out its responsibility for site selection
should be to select from among sites which are acceptable under the other criteria of this
Section those which will afford the greatest opportunity for inclusion of eligible applicants of all groups regardless of race, color, creed, or national origin, thereby affording
members of minority groups an opportunity to locate outside areas of concentration of
their own minority group. Any proposal to locate housing only in areas of racial concentration will be prima facie unacceptable .... ." HUD Low-RENT HousING MANUAL 205.1,
4(g) (Feb. 1967 rev.), cited in Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. La. 1969).

See also HUD Low-RENT

PRECONSTRUCTION

HANDBOOK,

RHA 7410.1, ch. 1, §1,

2(a)

(June 1969 rev.).
185. E.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669
(W.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
186. See note 184 supra.
187. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1964); Title VI of Civil Rights Act of
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City of Lansingss cited federal statutes 89 to reinforce its decision that a
referendum to rezone a proposed low-income housing site violated the Supremacy Clause.190 However, the decision was reversed by the Sixth Circuit,
which held that the housing manual regulations were merely guidelines,
without the force of federal law and thus not in conflict with state law. 9 1
The court went on to hold, however, that even if the manual were considered
92
to be federal law, no conflict with state laws existed.
On the other hand, the district court in Hicks v. Weaver 93 ruled that
the HUD interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 94 was
"entitled to considerable weight by the courts."' 9 5 The court held that
failure to locate low-income housing outside all-black neighborhoods created
a strong inference that Title VI was being violated. 96 But in Hicks zoning
was not responsible for the absence of housing outside black neighborhoods.
These cases may indicate that, as in equal protection challenges, lack of
provable discriminatory intent may dictate a result in favor of the local
ordinance.197
The use of a challenge based on the Supremacy Clause suffered a serious
setback in James v. Jaltierra98 when the Supreme Court rejected its application to referendum zoning. 99 Since the Court dealt only with referendum
zoning, the decision does not completely foreclose the use of the Supremacy
Clause as a challenge, but it renders the argument somewhat tenuous as the
statutes on which it relies may be similarly interpreted where the exclusion
is accomplished by other means.

1964, 42 US.C. §2000(d) (1964); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3601 (Supp. IV,
1965-1968).
188. 293 F. Supp. 801 (W.. Mich. 1969).
189. See note 187 supra for these statutes.
190. Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301, 309 (W.D. Mich. 1969). "Article VI,
clause 2, of the United States Constitution provides that the Constitution and all laws
enacted pursuant thereto shall be the supreme law of the land. An action approved by
the entire electorate of the State of Michigan could not serve to nullify rights created
by or arising out of the United States Constitution. There is little doubt that the action
by the City of Lansing in this case . . . would deprive plaintiffs of fundamental constiBecause of the supremacy clause of the Constitution, that
tutionally secured rights ....
action is impermissible." Id. at 310.
191. Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1969).
192. Id. at 323-25.
193. 302 F. Supp. 619 (ElD. La. 1969).
194. Id. at 622, citing HUD Low RETr HoUsING MANUAL, §205.1, 714(g) (Feb. 1967
rev.).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 623. See generally Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site
Selection, 23 STAN. L. Rav. 63 (1970).
197. See text accompanying notes 152-153 supra.
198. 402 US. 137 (1971).
199. Id. at 140. "By the Housing Act of 1937 the Federal Government has offered aid
to States and local governments for the creation of low-rent public housing. However, the
federal legislation does not purport to require that local governments accept this or to
outlaw local referendums on whether the aid should be accepted." Id.
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REMEDIAL LEGISLATION

Because the case-by-case approach is likely to accomplish reform only
in a piecemeal fashion and over a long period of time, legislation may prove
the most effective means of eliminating exclusionary zoning. Both Congress
and state legislatures are beginning to recognize this fact.
In the most innovative statutory approach yet taken, the Massachusetts
Legislature recently enacted a "Snob Zoning Amendment" 0 calculated to
override, to some extent, local opposition to low-income housing projects
and to stimulate construction of such projects in the suburbs. °1 A prospective builder may appeal to a state agency to review and reverse a refusal by
the local zoning board to waive local zoning restrictions by showing that
the decision was not "reasonable and consistent with local needs." °2 This
phrase is statutorily defined in terms of general regional need for low-income
housing. In turn, this depends on whether over ten per cent of the total
housing or over one and one-half per cent of the total land area is comprised of low-income housing, or alternatively, on whether the application
would result in the initiation of construction on three-tenths of a per cent
(or ten acres) of land area in the town in a given calendar year.2 0 3 Where these
limits have not been exceeded, the five-member board is empowered to issue
a comprehensive permit in lieu of the various permits required at the local
level.204 The aim of the Massachusetts procedure is to remove some of the
obstacles to low-income housing construction in the suburbs, and there are
indications that this is being accomplished.20 5
While no other state has yet adopted a similar approach, some states
have enacted redevelopment legislation granting the redevelopment agency
authority to override local zoning ordinances where cooperation is not forthcoming.- ° Furthermore, the President's Committee on Urban Housing has
similarly recommended that housing authorities be given the power to supersede local zoning ordinances in constructing low-income housing.- 0 Another
approach, proposed in New Jersey, was to limit the permissible objectives
of zoning so that "in no event shall any zoning ordinance be deemed to
have a valid objective if the effect of such ordinance is to exclude racial,
religious or ethnic minorities." ' °01
An Alabama statute enacted in 1935209 proscribes total exclusion of any
200. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 40B, §§20-23 (1969).
201. Note, Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HIv.J.
LEGis. 246, 257 (1970).
202. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§22-23 (1969).
203. Id. §20. The Act is criticized in HARv. J. LEGIS., supra note 201.
204. Id. §23.
205. Note, supra note 201, at 257 n.51.
206. E.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §6266(3) (McKinney 1970). But see FLA. STAT.
§§163.360 (1), (2) (a), (b) (3) (1969).
207.

PRESIDENT'S COMM.

ON URBAN

HOUSING,

TECHNICAL STUDIES 143

(1967).

208. N.J. S. 803 (1969), cited and discussed in Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 169, at 55.
The New Jersey legislature declined to accept such a far-reaching approach.
209. Ax. CODE tit. 37, §775 (1959).
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economic group, although permitting different residence districts by economic class. The statute prohibits zoning regulations that "discriminate in
favor of or against any class of inhabitants. 21° Enactment of similar legislation in other states would at least enable low-income groups to have access
to suburban housing, however, it would permit segregation within the community.
Members of Congress are also becoming aware of the threat posed by
exclusionary zoning. A bill recently introduced would deny federal assistance
under HUD programs to localities -that exclude federally assisted low-income
housing through restrictive land use practices.211 The bill would affect federal subsidies for projects such as water and sewer facilities as well as housing projects. If enacted, it will offer the suburbs the choice of either discontinuing exclusionary zoning practices or foregoing federal subsidies under
HUD programs.
Federally initiated attacks on exclusionary zoning are likely to be strongly
influenced by President Nixon's recent statement on federal policies for
equal housing.2- The President drew a sharp distinction between economic
and racial discrimination in housing, stating: "We will not seek to impose
economic integration upon an existing local jurisdiction,"213 but pledged
vigorous opposition to any racially motivated discrimination and promised
that "economic measures as a subterfuge for racial discrimination" would
not be tolerated. 214 He rejected proposals that would compel communities
to accept federally sponsored housing, but emphasized that communities
would be encouraged "to discharge their responsibility for helping to provide decent housing opportunities to the Americans of low and moderate
income who live or work within their boundaries."215
Although legislation may well offer the long-term solution to exclusionary zoning, judicial remedies are still the most feasible means of obtaining

210. Id.

211. The Urban Land Improvement and Housing Assistance Act of 1971, S. 609, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). Its sponsor, Senator Jacob Javits of New York, recognized: "The
housing crisis is particularly serious in the central cities where the available land is most
limited and most expensive. The poor can be effectively locked in this way into a decaying
inner city housing stock through fragmented, outmoded and restrictive suburban zoning
ordinances." 117 CONG. R C. 886 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1971) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
212. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1971, at 1, col. 8. An even more far-reaching proposal by
HUD Secretary George Romney would bar local governments from using zoning or building
codes to bar low-income projects in developing areas where federal programs are available.
See N.Y. Times, June 3, 1970, at 1, col. 5. The text of the proposed bill is quoted in Aloi
& Goldberg, supra note 169, at 62, citing Council of State Government, Newsletter, June 1,
1970.
215. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
214. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1971, at 14, col. 2. Three days after the Nixon statement, the

Justice Department filed suit against the town of Black Jack, Mo., United States v. City of
Black Jack, Docket No. 71C 372 (1) (E.D. Mo., fied June 14, 1971) (petitionlor declaratory
and injunctive relief. County adopted a zoning ordinance that had the effect of prohibiting
any new multiple-family use of occupancy within the city, effecting racii segregation in

housing).
215. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1971, at 14, col. R,
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immediate relief in a given situation. Recognizing that a majority of suburbanites do not want low-income housing in their neighborhoods, 216 legislators
are likely to proceed slowly in forcing housing on their constituents. Consequently, constitutional attacks in the courts will provide the principal
source of relief in the immediate future.
POTENTIAL AFFIRMATIVE

DUTY To

DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS

The problem of exclusionary zoning is not solved by determining that it
may be vulnerable to various constitutional attacks. Assuming a willingness
on the part of the courts to receive constitutional arguments, the question
of who is to propound them remains. Indigents, both black and white, have
been the most frequent plaintiffs attacking exclusionary zoning practices, 2 17
but their ability to litigate depends on legal and financial aid from special
interest organizations. 2 18 A more desirable plaintiff would be the local housing authority, at least in cases involving public housing. The issue then
becomes whether such housing officials have an affirmative duty to desegregate
219
the suburbs through low-income housing.
Where the affirmative duty question is more narrowly framed, as in cases
in which officials are being challenged for failure to locate low-income projects outside areas of racial concentration, court responses have been mixed.
Early decisions found no affirmative duty to desegregate. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority22o the court held that a showing of affirmative discriminatory state action was required. 221 The complaint was therefore dis216. National Polling Day: The Surprising Americans, ABC TV, Friday, April 16, 1971,
10:00-11:00 p.m. EST. The over-all response of the national sample to the question: "Are
you willing to have a low-income housing project located in your neighborhood?" was:
Willing - 60%, Not Willing - 36%, Not Sure - 4%. When subdivided into areas of residence,
the response of the sample group is more revealing:

Willing
Not Willing
Not Sure

Cities

Suburbs

Towns

Rural

59%
36%
5%

43%
51%
6%

74%
24%
2%

66%
31%
3%

Thus, only in the suburbs do opponents of low-income housing constitute a majority.
217. E.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.),
afl'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of
Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
218. E.g., NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Office for the Rights of
the Indigent, American Civil Liberties Union.
219. Where federal officials are involved, the duty to eliminate discrimination is clear.
Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 261 (Supp. 1962). The problem is that local officials constitute the housing authorities.
220. 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
221. Id. at 584. "A public housing program, conscientiously administered in accord
with the statutory mandates surrounding its inception and free of any intent or purpose,
however slight, to segregate the races, cannot be condemned even though it may not
affirmatively achieve alterations in existing patterns of racial concentration in housing, however desirable such alterations may be. A showing of affirmative discriminatory state action
is required." Id.
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missed because it failed to allege discriminatory intent in selection of housing sites. Likewise, a Florida federal district court rejected an attack on
low-income housing location where no discriminatory motive was shown. 222
In the somewhat analogous area of segregated educational facilities, however, courts are leaning toward an affirmative duty to integrate. 22 3 Recent
housing decisions also indicate that at least some courts believe local officials
have an affirmative duty to integrate.224 When the Tucson, Arizona, housing
authority located a low-income project in the only black middle class neighborhood in the city, a suit was brought alleging that the housing authority
had a positive duty to avoid discrimination. The Arizona court of appeals
agreed, finding the absence of racial considerations insufficient justification
for the action taken. 225 It held that the housing authority must avoid a
discriminatory effect in site selection. 2 20 In a similar situation the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held that HUD must assess the effect of federally
subsidized housing on increasing racial segregation,2 27 listing eleven factors
that should be considered.228

222. Thompson v. Housing Authority of City of Miami, 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
223. See Comment, 44 N.Y.UJ.. REV. 1172, 1176-78 (1969).
224. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); El Cortez Heights Residents
& Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Authority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294
(Ct. App. 1969).
225. El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Authority,
10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1969).
226. "We realize that the United States Constitution denounces racial classification for
the purposes of segregating the races, but we also believe the Constitution is very color
conscious, and that public housing sites should not be selected with eyes closed to the
racial composition of the area... The duty imposed . . . is not simply the negative duty
to not discriminate.It is a mandate that prohibits housing authorities from acting in a
manner that results in discrimination." Id. at 134, 457 P.2d at 296 (emphasis added).
227. Shannon v. HUD, 435 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
228. Id. at 821-22. "[We suggest that some considerations relevant to a proper de-

termination by HUD include the following:
"1. What procedures were used by the LPA [local public agency] in considering the
effects on racial concentration when it made a choice of site or type of housing?
"2. What tenant selection methods will be employed with respect to the proposed
project?
"3. How has the LPA or the local governing body historically reacted to proposals for
low income housing outside areas of racial concentration?
"4. Where is low income housing, both public and publicly assisted, now located in the
geographic area of the LPA?

"5. Where is middle income and luxury housing, in particular middle income and
luxury housing with federal mortgage insurance guarantees, located in the geographic
area of the LPA?
"6. Are some low income housing projects in the geographic area of the LPA occupied primarily by tenants of one race, and if so, where are they located?

"7. What is the projected racial composition of tenants of the proposed project?
"8. Will the project house school age children and if so what schools will they attend
and what is the racial balance in those schools?

"9. Have the zoning and other land use regulations of the local governing body in the
geographic area of the LPA had the effect of confining low income housing to certain
areas, and if so how has this effected [sic] rial

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/4
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The conclusion to be drawn from these decisions is that the courts
are still groping for an answer to the affirmative duty question. The apparent trend is toward recognition of a duty on the part of officials to avoid
direct discrimination, but as yet only the Arizona court has expressly required desegregation through housing location.229 No court has found an
affirmative duty where the segregation is economic rather than racial, and
in light of the Supreme Court's decision on referendum zoning,2s0 movement
in that direction will probably be slow. Furthermore, no case has found
that housing or city officials have an obligation to contest local zoning ordinances that exclude housing projects. In all of the cases thus far decided
in the affirmative duty area, zoning has been a primary issue in only one
case.

23

1

CONCLUSION

While the affirmative duty issue may not be resolved in the foreseeable
future, there does appear to be expanding awareness of the problems posed
by exclusionary zoning in all its forms and a growing willingness by the
courts and legislatures to deal with the problems in a manner that will obviate the more serious abuses. The arsenal of potential challenges is expanding dramatically as judges and legislators seek solutions that will insure meaningful choices to the poor in housing location.
The most blatant discrimination has been all but eliminated; the more
subtle methods are now under attack. Whether changes will be wrought
through legislation or court decision is immaterial. Reliance on either to the
exclusion of the other limits the effectiveness of a permanent solution.
Constitutional challenges suffer the infirmity of being factually distinguishable in subsequent court tests; legislation, while more encompassing, is
meaningful only if enforced. In the absence of comprehensive statutes, lowincome groups must rely on litigation to establish their right to be free from
discrimination in housing location and choice. At least some courts appear
willing to respond to these appeals.
PHILLIP R. FINCH

"10. Are there alternative available sites?
"11. At the site selected by the LPA how severe is the need for restoration, and are
other alternative means of restoration available which would have preferable effects on
racial concentration in that area?"
The court added: "The time may come when, in order to achieve the goals of the
national housing policy, HUD will have to take steps to overcome the effects of contrasts
in urban and suburban land use regulations. What those steps should be we do not here
suggest." Id. at 822. Retired Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, writing for the Second
Circuit, implied that the duty to affirmatively integrate communities existed when he
stated: "Even were we to accept the City's allegation that any discrimination . . .resulted
from thoughtlessness rather than a purposeful scheme, the City may not escape responsibility for placing its black citizens under a severe disadvantage which it cannot justify."
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970).
229. El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners Ass'n v. Tuscon Housing Authority,
10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1969).
230. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See text accompanying notes 140-153 supra.
231. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970).
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